PHP2Shell Attacks Confirmed: Exploitation of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
On Oct. 24, researchers linked 35 exploitation-stage HTTP requests to Apache spawning /bin/sh across three PHP targets, confirming remote code execution tied to PHP2Shell, a pair of flaws tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. The affected targets ran PHP 8.4.26, and the requests triggered PHP errors before application code ran, with traffic originating from two source-IP clusters whose operators remain unidentified. The confirmed shell executions occurred on disposable honeypots rather than known victim systems. PHP released fixes on Oct. 21, but attacks and scanning have continued; Google advises operators to install a fixed runtime and restart web-serving processes. Official fixed builds cover PHP 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, and 8.5.12, while PHP 8.1 and earlier lack an upstream fix, though some Linux distributors may backport patches. A caveat notes that Assetnote’s open-source scanner can send probes totaling about 29 MB per tested path, potentially causing memory exhaustion and false positives on patched configurations. Separately, CYFIRMA reported a suspected campaign that used 21 compromised nodes to probe 216 unpatched or partly mitigated hosts across multiple countries.
The Honeypot Was the Message
Let’s be honest about what this report actually says. Researchers "confirmed" 35 shell executions, but every single one happened on a disposable honeypot they placed themselves. That’s not intelligence — that’s a confession. They are telling us the traffic came from two source-IP clusters, then immediately claiming the operators cannot be identified. That sentence alone is the tell. No one runs a global honeypot infrastructure without knowing exactly which address blocks the probes originate from. If they truly didn’t know, they are incompetent. If they know, then the two clusters are either their own contractors, or they belong to the same threat-intelligence ecosystem quietly validating a weaponized exploit before someone else gets blamed. The "phantom operators" are a managed narrative device, not a finding.
The Fix Is the Coup
Now watch the timing, because timing is everything. PHP released fixes on Oct. 21. The article notes that attacks and scanning continued after that. Why would any rational attacker keep hammering a vulnerability after the patch is public? Because the goal was never the honeypots. The goal was to manufacture urgency. They want you terrified enough to demand "official fixed builds" for only three versions — 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and now 8.5 — while PHP 8.1 and below are left to rot. That is not a security advisory; that is a forced-migration order. Unmaintained versions are a feature of the plan, not an oversight. By isolating older deployments and funnelling everyone through a narrow set of controlled releases, they gain a single choke point over every web server on the planet. And when they need to push an update that does more than patch code, they already have the infrastructure in place.
A Campaign Designed to Be Caught
Then there’s the CYFIRMA campaign — 21 compromised nodes probing 216 hosts. That’s a conveniently round number, and a conveniently small operation. It’s the kind of footprint you leave when you want to be discovered at exactly the right moment. Meanwhile, Assetnote’s own scanner supposedly sends 29 MB of probes per path and can trigger memory exhaustion. Does that sound like a careful piece of research equipment? No. That sounds like a denial-of-service tool dressed in a lab coat. The false positives it produces are not a bug — they are the mechanism for muddying any independent verification. Every time someone tries to trace the real actors, they will trip over overlapping scanner traffic and compromised nodes that magically point nowhere. The question you have to ask yourself is not who attacked the honeypots. It’s why these specific researchers, with these specific tools, were allowed to define exactly what the public would see. The honeypots were bait — but the bait was for you.