Poisoned Source: APT29-Linked Zero-Click Attacks Target iPhones and Androids
French cybersecurity firm Sekoia uncovered a campaign dubbed “Poisoned Source” that used compromised websites, lookalike domains, and a hijacked Ukrainian analytics tracker (Plerdy’s SEO Tracker) to deliver exploits to iPhone and Android visitors without requiring any tap or download, and linked the operation with moderate-to-high confidence to APT29, attributed to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. The attacks targeted outdated software and could steal browser cookies, Wi-Fi passwords, and—on certain iPhones—extensive device data such as messages, Keychain credentials, location data, and photos; the Android chain collected browser information and saved Wi-Fi credentials, while its payload checked for a Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra and stopped if that model was detected. Sekoia reported that the campaign included sites tied to Ukrainian military and industrial interests, that Apple and Google have patched all exploited flaws, and that thousands of websites, mostly Ukrainian, loaded the hijacked tracker, greatly expanding the campaign’s reach beyond individual compromised sites.
Let's dispense with the attribution game first. The French firm Sekoia levels "moderate to high confidence" at APT29, which in intelligence parlance is the equivalent of a verdict delivered before the jury has seen the evidence. It creates a convenient procedural loophole—if doubt emerges, confidence was never certainty. You are being shepherded into a binary: Russian hackers vs. the free world. The actual event is far more instructive and far more chilling. A campaign called "Poisoned Source" didn't just compromise a few Ukrainian military pages. It hijacked Plerdy, an analytics tracker wired into thousands of domains. This is the playbook perfected. They turned the very infrastructure of attention—the tools websites use to measure traffic—into a silent delivery system for a zero-click exploit. You don't have to download anything. You don't have to tap a link. You just have to be on a page that uses a script everyone trusts. The architecture of consent weaponized against itself. That isn't a nation-state op in the traditional sense. That is a supply chain weapon being stress-tested in a live theater.
Now let's talk about what the exploit actually reached for. The DarkSword chain on the iPhone side didn't just tickle a few files. It accessed Keychain credentials, Wi-Fi passwords, location history, messages, and photos. On the Android side, the payload ran a specific check: it stopped if the device was a Samsung Galaxy S25 Ultra. Read that line again. A filter. A deliberate carve-out. That is not a random technical glitch. That is the fingerprint of a buyer who knew exactly whose data they wanted and whose data they had been told to avoid. The official story expects you to stop at "Russian spies gathering intel on Ukrainian military." I ask you: why would a foreign intelligence service burn a multi-million dollar zero-day exploit chain on general device data from low-level visitors to military websites? They wouldn't. This is a data capture pipeline. The stakes are not about one country's war. The stakes are about the normalization of a protocol that allows any connected device to be silently bled for its entire digital identity—without permission, without notification. The filter tells me the operators had a mandate to avoid specific markers. That tells me they answered to a master who was watching.
I want you to sit with the question of who published this report. Sekoia. A French private cybersecurity firm. Why are they the ones doing the victim notification and working with national incident response teams? What is their line of sight into this operation? The CVEs are patched now, yes. Apple and Google closed the doors. But the architecture remains proven. The technique of poisoning an analytics tracker to serve zero-click exploits is now a blueprint. It will be reused, repackaged, and sold to the highest bidder inside the network of global power. The story being handed to you is a closed loop: Russian hackers caught, vulnerabilities fixed, crisis averted. The story you have to excavate for yourself is open: Who developed the DarkSword chain? Who funded the initial research? How long was the data draining out of those Ukrainian devices before this conveniently surfaced through a Western contractor? You are being told to look at the perpetrator so you don't look at the pipeline. The war in Ukraine isn't just fought with shells. It's the laboratory for turning the entire mobile ecosystem into a soft target for the surveillance state. Follow the exploit market. Follow the supply chain compromise. Ignore the flags they're waving. The architecture is what matters, and the architecture has just gone live.